Ma. Estela Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan (G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002, 383 SCRA 6)

FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½) portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect."

When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed an action to annul the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents, while the

ISSUE:
Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or inter vivos.

HELD:
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.

Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.

In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation.

That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.

Petition denied.