Apolonia Ocampo vs. Fidela Ocampo (G.R. No. 150707, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 547)

FACTS:
Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have ten children, including the petitioners and respondents to this case. In the celebration of their marriage, they acquired several properties, all of which are owned in common by their children. However, the residential/commercial lot in Nabua, Camarines Sur is ostensibly owned by Fidela Ocampo, although the latter acknowledges that the same is co-owned by her and her siblings.

Aside from the first complaint that they have filed before the trial court, petitioners also filed a supplemental complaint where they allege that Fidela Ocampo cancelled the first TCT of the lot in Nabua and issued a new one in the form of Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and her spouse Vicente Barrito. Both the donor of the donee are notoriously aware that the lot is still under dispute in the petitioners' first complaint, nevertheless, the two still pursued the donation. Petitioners also allege that the transfer of ownership from Fidela to Belen, daughter of another defendant Felicidad, is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs and defendants herein.

Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela has been the absolute owner of the property since 1949, and that its title is free from all encumbrances and adverse claims. In 1984, Fidela conveyed the property to Belen via a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos and since September 13, 1987, Belen has been the absolute owner of the same property.

In its decision, the Appellate Court said that other than the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership executed by Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was offered to establish petitioners’ claim of co-ownership. It also said that respondents were able to give clear proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer Certificate of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela, and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.

ISSUE:
Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs of their hereditary shares, is said deed valid?

HELD:
The Petition has no merit.

Belen presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s ratiocination:

"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s interest since the alleged acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against."

Lydia Sumipat vs. Brigido Banga (G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 521)

FACTS:
On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated "DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT-CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in favor of his illegitimate children (defendants-appellees) covering the three parcels of land (the properties). On the document appears the signature of his wife Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent thereto. That time, Lauro was already very sick and bedridden; that upon defendant-appellee Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipat’s) hand in affixing his signature on the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed document, as she did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to her query on what it was all about.

After Lauro Sumipat’s death on January 30, 1984, his wife Placida and defendants-appellees jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant. As plaintiff-appellant’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received any and learning that the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal.

Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she claiming to have acquired knowledge of its existence only on January 10, 1983 or five days after its execution when Lauro Sumipat gave the same to her.

The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant-appellees, because it found that the subject properties are conjugal having been acquired during the marriage of Lauro Sumipat and Placida Tabotabo (Placida). However, because Placida failed to question the genuineness and due execution of the deed and even admitted having affixed her signature thereon, the trial court declared that the entirety of the subject properties, and not just Lauro Sumipat’s conjugal share, were validly transferred to the defendants, the petitioners herein.

On appeal, the appellate court held that since Placida was unlettered, the appellees, the petitioners herein, as the parties interested in enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving that the terms thereof were fully explained to her. This they failed to do.

ISSUE:
Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.

HELD:
Art. 749 of the Civil Code states that:

"In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.


The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.


If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments."

Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.20

In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.

Apolinaria Austria-Magat vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002, 375 SCRA 556)

FACTS:
On December 17, 1975, Basilisa Comerciante, mother of petitioner and one of respondents, furnished a Deed of Donation to donate her house and lot to her four children (petitioner and respondent included), provided that the funeral expenses will be deducted from the total value of the lot before it is to be divided among the children. The children signed to the same deed in acceptance to the donation. That same day, they also signed into a notarized document stating that the property and the document pertaining to the same will be under the custody of the original owner (Comerciante) for as long as she lives. On February 6, 1979, Comerciante executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same house and lot in favor of the petitioner, prompting the respondents to file an action against the petitioner for the annulment of the deed of sale on September 21, 1983. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondent (petitioner herein), but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision.

CONTENTIONS:
Trial Court: (1) The donation is a donation mortis causa based on the provision on the deed of donation that it would take effect upon the death of the donor. (2) The provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of a will (3) Inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void and produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction.

CA: A provision in the deed of donation in question providing for the irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos. By those words, the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the house and lot in question. The right to dispose of a property is a right essential to full ownership. Hence, ownership of the house and lot was already with the donees even during the donor’s lifetime.

HELD:
We affirm the appellate court’s decision.

In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive. In the Bonsato case, we held that:

What is most significant [in determining the type of donation] is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation.

Appellate Court decision affirmed.

Ma. Estela Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan (G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002, 383 SCRA 6)

FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½) portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect."

When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed an action to annul the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents, while the

ISSUE:
Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or inter vivos.

HELD:
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.

Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.

In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation.

That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.

Petition denied.

Heirs of Juan and Felipe Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-6600, July 30, 1954, 95 Phil 481)

FACTS:
On the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents.

Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.

The lower court ruled that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.

In the Court of Appeals, majority of the justices declared that the aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two justices, however, dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter vivos.

HELD:
Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.

ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);


(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R. 
L-4326, November 18, 1952);


(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).

Marcelino Espino vs. Spouses Ricardo and Emma Vicente (G.R. No. 168396, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 337)

FACTS:
The crux of the controversy in this case arose from the execution by Emerenciana and Marcelina Espino on January 9, 1997 of a document, denominated as "Pagkakaloob," purportedly donating two lots to respondent Emma Vicente, the wife of Ricardo Vicente, nephew of Emerenciana.

It appears that sometime in December 1996, Emma convinced Marcelina and Emerenciana that she could facilitate the registration and titling in their name of the house and lot where they are staying. Emma allegedly asked Emerenciana and Marcelina who are both illliterate to sign a document to be used in titling the property in their name.

Subsequently, Emerenciana and Marcelina learned that the document they signed was a Deed of Donation or a "Pagkakaloob," of the house and lot in favor of Emma, including the 20 square-meter portion that was earlier sold to Marissa. As a consequence, when Emma filed an application for free patent with the DENR-PENRO Office of Malolos, Bulacan on January 13, 1997, Marissa delos Santos filed an opposition with the DENR-PENRO and the Register of Deeds. On the other hand, Emerenciana and Marcelina executed a Deed of Revocation of Donation or "Kasulatan ng Pagpapawalang Bisa sa Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob".

Petitioners then filed a petition for annulment of patent/title and reconveyance of real property with damages with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan dated April 14, 1997. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but when the respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the lower court’s decision and concluding that the assailed deed of donation enjoys the legal presumption of due execution and validity.

HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit.

A DONATION is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or a right in favour of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposed the following requisites:

(1) It should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
(2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous.

The parties' intention must be clear and that attendance of vice of consent, like in any other contract, renders the donation voidable.

It is evident that fraud attended the act of respondent Emma when she procured the signatures of Marcelino and Emerciana. There is fraud when through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induces into a contract which without them, he would have agreed to. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla De Leon (G.R. No. 149570, March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 447)

FACTS:
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828 square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay therein without any rentals therefor.

In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. The latter refused and failed to vacate the property.

De Leon's heirs contends the following: a). Defendants’ possession of the premises was merely on the tolerance of the late Teresa de Leon. b). The alleged Deed of Donation does not exist, is patently a falsified document and can never be the source of any right whatsoever.

At their very first answer to the complaint, Florencio's heirs contend that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted the donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page one of the deed.

Florencio's heirs argue further that: a). Defendants do not have only a better right of possession over the questioned parcel of land and they do not have only the absolute and lawful possession of the same but they have the absolute and lawful ownership of the same not only against the plaintiffs but against the whole world. b). Defendants are entitled to their counterclaim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo Florencio, who appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to the physical or material possession of the property over the respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the property.

HELD:
The petition has no merit.

As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donee’s acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.